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BALANCING THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE STATE,
THE ADOPTI PARENTS AND THE BiRTH PARENTs--
WHERE DOES THE ADOPTE FiT IN?.
Audra Behn6*
I. IRODUCTION
Graphing the family tree is an interesting project for most children.
It allows the child to fill each leaf of the tree with family history and
connect the branches between ancestors until the branches lead to the
child standing as the trunk. However, what about the child who has
no leaves to fill in or branches to connect, but only a trunk?
Prior to 1930, birth records were not sealed, and any member of
the adoption process could access them.' However, currently only
Alaska and Kansas allow adoptees to access birth records without the
consent of the biological parents.2 In every other state, records, the
only ancestral link an adoptee has, are sealed away under the guise of
the "best interest of the child."3 The adoptee is issued a new birth
*The author is a 1995 -graduate of Southwestern University School of- Law, and
is employed by the Los Angeles law firm of Korenberg, Abramowitz and Seldun.
JOAN H. oLLiNGER, ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACnTCE § 13.01(3) (1995)
[hereinafter HOLLINGER, ET AL.]; see also CHusTiNE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L.
PIERCE, PH.D., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OFADOPTION 211 (Facts on File, Inc. 1991)
[hereinafter ADAMEC].
2 HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.03(4); See ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.50.500 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1992).
3 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
(The Free Press 1973) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN].
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certificate which substitutes the adoptive parents for the birth parents.4
The original birth records are kept within the court and remain sealed
for 99 years.5 This comment examines the history of adoption laws and
the short life sealed records have had in adoption history.
This comment also analyzes the state's, the birth parents', the
adoptive parents', and adoptee's roles in the adoption process. The
state represents the adoptee in the adoption contract and promises
anonymity to the birth parents and the adoptive parents. Because the
state acts on behalf of the adoptee, the adoptee is bound by this
promise. This promise is further protected by the birth parents' right
to privacy and the adoptive parents' right to raise the adoptee without
interference. Adoptees have unsuccessfully argued that the sealed
record statutes violate their Equal Protection rights and their right to
receive information under the First Amendment.
In addition, this comment addresses the courts' role in
upholding sealed record statutes using "good cause" and "in the best
interest of the child" standards. There is no uniform definition of
"good cause" or "in the best interest of the child." As a result,
inconsistent rulings have emerged, making the judicial system an
unreliable and frustrating outlet for adoptees.
Part VI of this comment examines the 1994 Uniform Adoption
Act and the lack of influence it has had on adoption laws. Since its
enactment, the Uniform Adoption Act has failed in its purpose of
unifying state adoption laws. It has been heavily criticized b.y several
groups, including adoption agencies, social workers and family law
judges, for favoring adoptive parents at the expense of birth parents
and adoptees.
' See Uniform Adoption Act § 3-802(a), (b) & (c) (1994). See also HOLLINGER,
ET AL., supra note 1, at § 13.01(1)(a); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10434
(West 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 114 (Consol. 1995); N.J. STAT. § 26:8-
40.1 (West 1996).
1 See, e.g., Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 4, at § 6-102(d).
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This comment also explores alternative methods to the current
adoption process. Presently, volunteer registries have developed where
birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees register in hopes of
connecting with one another. However, these registries are only
successful if the parties join the same registry. Independent and open
adoptions also exist which allow the birth parents and the adoptive
parents to meet. In independent adoptions, the contact between birth
parents and adoptive parents ceases after the child is born. However,
in open adoptions, the birth parents remain in contact with the adoptive
parents even after the adoption. The degree of contact is usually
determined by the parties.
Finally, this comment suggests a new approach to the adoption
process. Currently, adoptees must show "good cause" to open their
birth records. Because there is no uniform definition of "good cause,"
this is a difficult standard to meet. This comment proposes a new
approach. The legislature and the courts should decide on one
definition for "good cause," and birth parents and adoptees should
share the burden of proving whether or not good cause has been
shown. Birth parents should be required to show "good cause" why
birth records should not be released, and this showing should be
balanced against the adoptee's showing of "good cause" why the
records should be opened. This way courts can balance the needs of
all parties as opposed to simply placing a burden of proof on the
adoptee.
I. THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION REco DS IN TE UNITED STATES
Statutes mandating sealed records have a short history. The
first adoption statutes were enacted in the mid 1800's. These statutes
did not create adoption, but served to legitimize previous transfers of
parental rights.6 "Early adoption statutes made no provisions for the
confidentiality of adoption proceedings, the details of which were often
6 HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.02 (2).
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reported in the newspaper .... Original birth certificates... were
available to adoptees on demand."7
Even statutes enacted in the 1920s, which required adoption
records to be confidential, did not "preserve anonymity between
biological parents. . . .These statutes barred all persons from.
inspecting the files except for the parties to the adoption and their
attorneys."8 It was not until the 1930's that statutes were enacted
requiring adoption records to be sealed.9 At this time, most states
rather suddenly felt that there was a need to break away from the long
history of open adoptions, and to create an "atmosphere of honesty. 10
Legislators reasoned that birth parents would be more forthcoming in
supplying correct information if they were guaranteed anonymity.'
Unfortunately, such anonymity does not guarantee that birth
parents will give more reliable information. 2 Futher, the possibility
that "more correct" information might result from closed adoptions is
rather meaningless. The people who would benefit most from
improving the accuracy of information received by birth parents are the
7 Id. at § 1.03(4).
'Id. at § 1.03(4) (emphasis in original).
' Id. at § 1.04. See also Victor Bradbury & Michael J. Daly III, Who is My
Mother? Who is My Father?, FAM. ADVOCATE, Fall 1981, at 14; see also
ADAMEC, supra note 1, at 211.
10 See Susan E. Simanek, Adoption Records Reform: Impact on Adoptees, 67
MARQ. L. REV. 110, 124 (1983). See Debra D. Poulin, The Open Adoption
Records Movement. Constitutional Cases and Legislative Compromise, 26 J.
FAM. L. 395, 410 (1987-88).
" Poulin, supra note 10, at 410.
12 "Seventeen years ago when I gave up a child for adoption I gave the social
worker wrong information about the father. I wonder how many other mothers
gave wrong information that will be passed on to the child. I would like to
correct this." ARTHUR D. SOROSKY, ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 63
(1984) (letter written by a birth mother).
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adoptees themselves; however, the fact that an adoption is closed
prevents the adoptee from ever receiving the information the birth
parents provide.'3 What difference does it make if the information is
obtained in an "atmosphere of honesty" if it remains locked away?
I1. THE ADOPION TRuNGLE
The adoption process has often been represented as a triangle,
including the birth parents, the adoptive parents, and the adoptee.
14
However, such a representation is inaccurate, as it leaves out a very
important player - the state.
Adoption did not exist at common law. It is entirely a creature
of statute. 5 The state plays a vital role in carrying out the laws that
govern the adoption process.'6 It is the state that insists that one side
of the "triangle" be hidden.
13 See e.g., Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 4, at § 6-102(d)(e).
All records on file with the court must be retained permanently
and sealed for 99 years after the date of the adoptee's birth..
.Any additional information about an adoptee, the adoptee-s
former parents, and the adoptee's genetic history that is
submitted to the court within the 99-year period, must be added
to the sealed records of the court.
Id.
14 See generally SOROSKY, supra note 12.
15 See Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J.
Ch. 1977). "Adoption was unknown at common law. Adoption and its legal
consequences 'are of statutory origin, to serve a sociofamilial policy of prime
import."' Id. (quoting In re Holibaugh, 18 N.J. Sup. Ct. .229, 233 (1955)
(citations omitted).
16 HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 13.01(1)(a).
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A. The Role of the State
In the adoption process, the state enters into a contractual
relationship with the birth parents and adoptive parents.17 Under this
contract, the birth parents agree to relinquish their child in exchange
for anonymity." The adopting parents take the child with the
assurance that sealed records prevent future interference by the birth
parents. 19
Missing from the formation of this contract is the party most
bound by it - the adopted child. The state is supposed to represent the
child's best interest.' However, the state is so concerned with
protecting the integrity of the adoption process that the rights of the
child are lost in the very process that is meant to protect those rights.1
17 See, e.g., Sorenson v. Churchill, 212 N.W. 488, 489 (S.D. 1927).
11 Mills at 649; Application of Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (1978);
Poulin, supra note 11, at 410. "[S]tates have quasi-contractual relationships with
birth parents and adoptive parents. States, in brokering adoptions, make
'agreements' with their citizens. One of the state's promises is that identifies
shall remain private."
19 See Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d at.781; See also Mills, 372 A.2d at 649.
20 "Confidentiality also protects adopted children who are illegitimate from any
possible stigma they might otherwise have to bear because of their birth."
Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 781. However, in the 1994 amendment of the
Uniform Adoption Act, a guardian ad litem may be appointed for an adoptee at
the discretion of the court. Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 4, at § 3-201.
21 Sorenson, 212 N.W. at 489, cited in Carol Riccardello, Adoptees' Right to
Identity-A Ninth Amendment Approach to the Sealed Birth Certificate, 27 S.D. L.
REv. 122, 134 n.106 (1981); see also Mills, 372 A.2d at 649: "The child, who
is the ... ultimately most important party to the adoption, has no voice in the
proceeding."
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Courts have clung to the belief that secrecy protects the
adoption process, and "promotes an atmosphere of honesty" between
the birth parent and state?23 However, secrecy is not necessary for the
adoption process to function adequately. Currently, two states and
many foreign countries advocate a system of open adoption.24
Society and its mores have changed over the last two decades.
Yet courts adhere to decisions that were articulated in an era when
unplanned pregnancies and single mothers were severely chastised?5
22 See, e.g., Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 418 N.E.2d 1302 (N.Y.
1981).
Confidentiality serves several purposes. It shields the adopted
child from possibly disturbing facts surrounding his or her
birth and parentage, it permits the adoptive parents to develop
a close relationship with the child free from interference or
distraction and it provides the natural parents with an
anonymity that they may consider vital . . . . The State's
interest in fostering an orderly and supervised system of
adoption is closely tied to these interest of the parties involved
1d. at 1303 (citations omitted).
' Simanek, supra note 10, at 124.
24 See supra note 1; See also Round One: Landmark Adoption Legislation
Affirmed by New Jersey Assembly, Decree (Am. Adoption Congress, Wash,
D.C.) Spring 1995, at 1.
Australia, Finland, Great Britain, Israel, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand and Scotland... allow access [to
original birth certificates] once an adoptee has reached the age
of majority. Despite this, state legislatures in the U.S. have
been slow in responding to the urging of adoption-related
persons to change the laws passed during the Sealed Record
Era.
Id.; See also Bradbury, supra note 9, at 19.
' A birth mother, who relinquished her child for adoption in 1967, poignantly
describes the lack of choice that existed in this era because of the social stigma
that surrounded unplanned pregnancies. Back in 1967, there was a terrible
stigma attached to illegitimacy. It was generally believed a child labeled
illegitimate (or worse) would be at a terrible social disadvantage. Indeed, even
1996-1997
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The state's desire to cling to the notion that secrecy is a
necessary part of the adoption process perpetuates this taboo attached
to unplanned pregnancies.
However, secrecy cannot erase the psychological and emotional
consequences of an adoption. The birth parents are left carrying a
burden in silence. 26 The adoptive parents are left fearing the
"unknown." The adoptee is left with a contract he or she never
signed.2
7
B. Birth Parents and Their Right to Privacy
The majority of parents who give their children up for adoption
the birth certificate stated that the birth was illegitimate. More than likely, a
young mother and the child born into this situation would either live in poverty
or become dependent upon other family members. Many young women were
coerced into relinquishing their babies because of these fears, and the belief that
they'd never find a decent man to marry them if an illegitimate child was part of
the package. Times have changed so much that people who didn't live the
scenario probably find what I am saying to be pathetic and hard to believe. Well,
the women's movement hadn't really taken hold yet, and a decent lifestyle did
still dependent on a "man's" income. Letter from a birth mother. to Audra
Behnd, Staff Editor, Southwestern University Law Review (September 17, 1994)
(on file with the Southwestern University Law Review).
26 See HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 13.01(1)(c)(1993). Studies have
shown that some biological mothers are unable to achieve closure after the
adoption has taken place and continue to suffer from the loss of their child for
many years; this continued sense of loss may be exacerbated by lack of access
to an information about the child. Moreover, because of a different social
context, the guarantee of confidentiality is no longer the incentive that it once
was for a biological mother trying to make a decision about adoption. Id. See
also Carolyn Burke, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His
Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1196, 1215-16 (1975).
27 Sorenson, 212 N.W. at 489.
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are unwed teenagers,2 faced with the most frightening decision of their
lives - should they get an abortion, raise the child, or put it up for
adoption? Those who choose the final option join the ranks as birth
parents in the adoption "triangle."
Whether sealed records are truly desired by these birth parents
is an issue of great controversy. Courts have suggested that the
purpose of sealed records is to allow birth parents to "go on with their
lives." 2 9 However, the birth parents do not simply forget and go on.30
Just because a child is put up for adoption does not mean it was
unwanted. "It should be emphasized that in most cases, the mother
relinquishes her baby to assure him/her of love, care, and security
from two parents in a normal home situation that she cannot
28 See SOROsKY, supra note 12, at 47.
The National Center for Social Services estimated that in 1971,
60 percent of all children adopted in the United States, about
101,000 were born out of wedlock. This statistic is misleading
because it implies, without explanation, that 40 percent of the
children placed for adoption are legitimate. It is important to
differentiate between the traditional nonrelative adoptive
placement and the relative or step-parent adoption. Most of the
60 percent represents nonrelative adoptions, while most of the
40 percent represents relative or step-parent adoptions.
Id.
29 See, e.g., In the Matter of Linda F.M., 418 N.E.2d at 1303. Although the
sudden reappearance of the child may often be a source of great pleasure to the
natural parent, in other cases it may be a destructive intrusion into the life that
the parent has built in years since the adoption. It may be the source of much
discomfort. In some cases, it may even open the way for the child or others to
blackmail the natural parents by threatening to disclose embarrassing
circumstances surrounding the birth. Id.
30 See CAROLE A. McKELVEY & DR. JOELLEN STEvENS, ADOPTION CRISIS: THE
TRUTH BEHIND ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE, 165 (Fulcrum Publishing 1994).
"Most birth parents can not forget the children they bore as teenagers, and some
have banded together to form 'search groups' such as Concerned United Birth
Parents (CUB), Adoption Triangle Ministry (ATM) and American Adoption
Congress (AAC)." Id.
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provide."31 Signing a piece of paper does not erase the pain and sense
of loss that a birth mother or father endures. 32
Courts also suggest that allowing an adoptee to re-enter a birth
parent's life would be very disruptive.33 However, courts are assuming
that birth parents would view a reunion with an adoptee as an
intrusion. On the contrary, many birth parents have expressed a desire
31Id. at49.
32 In a letter, a birth mother expressed the emptiness that remains years after
giving her child up for adoption. "I have never forgotten my child. I hope she
is well and happy. I hope she will someday want to know me. I will always
long for the child I carried, but never held." SOROSKY, supra note 12, at 59.
11 In a letter, a birth mother expressed her concerns about the possibility of the
child she had given up for adoption returning:
As a young woman living in shame, I was grateful, after
having made my decision to relinquish, to be promised that I
could never be found. The adoption records would be sealed
away forever, and I could pretend none of this ever happened.
I went on my way and started a new life of secrets and denial.
I must also admit, that in those early years, I believe that
opening the sealed records could have caused problems for me
as well as for the other sides of the triad. I did have a fear
that a young man might show up on my doorstep one day,
unannounced, and upset my husband and young children (who
did not know about him). I still felt ashamed and did not want
"the neighbors" to ever know what had happened to me in my
youth. But enough said, that never happened. If society had
the same attitude about illegitimacy today as in the past, I
might be more inclined to believe that sealed records should be
continued. But let's face it, times really have changed. Birth
mothers don't need to be protected from anything nowadays.
And the benefits of opening the records far outweigh the
occasional negative situations which might occur.
Letter from a birth mother to Audra Behn6, Staff Editor, Southwestern University
Law Review (September 17, 1994) (on file with the Southwestern University Law
Review).
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to reunite with the child they once gave up.' For many, such a
reunion would provide closure to a time in their lives that has weighed
heavily on their hearts and mnds.'
Despite the picture the state portrays of birth parents and their
desire for privacy, the opinions of birth parents actually have no
bearing on whether or not adoption records are sealed. After the
1930s, sealing records became a standard procedire.36 Birth parents'
preferences were no longer considered.37 The state simply assumed,
" In a study conducted by Dr. Sorosky, 82 percent of the birth mothers who
relinquished children were interested in reuniting with their child. See SOROSKY,
supra note 12, at 53. "I fear he may not understand why I gave him up and hate
me for it. I would like to be able to explain this to him for his sake." Id. at 61.
3 In telling of her experience reuniting with her son, a birth mother wrote:
[w]hen I was initially contacted by the state, I was very
surprised. I had made a conscious decision years earlier not to
search myself, because the situation had been so painful to me
and I didn't think I could handle a possible rejection. I had
pretty well stored the whole experience away in my denial file.
But I was very happy that he took the initiative to find me, and
I promptly gave my permission for contact.
Letter from a birth mother to Audra Behn6, Staff Editor, Southwestern University
Law Review (September 17, 1994) (on file with the Southwestern University Law
Review).
11 See HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.04.
37 SOROSKY, supra note 12, at 49. "The commonly held assumption that the
birth mother wants to completely sever ties with the child and begin life a new
needs to be re-examined. In actuality, the mother's greatest concern is usually
that her child will never forgive her for abandoning him/her." Id.
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without consulting the birth parents, that closing the door on
"illegitimate '38 children would be better for everyone involved.39
It is true that the desire to open previously sealed records is not
unanimously shared among birth parents.40 A minority of birth parents
want birth records to remain sealed.41 They contend that anonymity
was part of the adoption contract, and that opening records violates
their right to privacy.42 Unfortunately, courts have decided that this
minority's "right" to such privacy should be valued over the desires of
38 "Illegitimate" is a label given by the courts to a child given up for adoption.
It is an archaic term. The fact that children can still be labeled "illegitimate"
today is a signal that courts should re-evaluate their reasoning. See, e.g.,
Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
31 "Maybe 2 percent of birth mothers would like to keep their secret. So do we
make laws to serve 2 percent of the group? Do we torture the other 98 percent,
not to mention all the adoptees, because 2 percent would rather forget?" Dina
Baker, The Hunt is on: Adoptees, Birth Parents Search, CH. TRm., May 31,
1992, at 3.
o See SOROSKY, supra note 12, at 53. "When asked if [birth parents] would be
interested in a reunion with the child they relinquished, 82 per cent said yes, if
the adoptee desired to meet them .... " Id.
41 See SOROSKY, supra note 12, at 71. "I have closed all doors behind me for my
protection and peace of mind. I do not want them opened by a curious child."
Id. (letter from a birth mother). It is interesting to note that the birth mother
referred to the adoptee as a child. This birth mother did not consider the
ramifications of sealed records when the "curious child" becomes a curious adult,
seeking medical records or other necessary information.
42 People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1955).
[It has assured the mother, who has given birth to a child born
out of wedlock and finds that she cannot properly take care of
the child, that instead of secreting the child or placing it with
persons haphazardly, if she wishes to permit suitable desirous
and qualified persons to adopt the infant her indiscretion will
not be divulged. Id.
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the majority of birth parents, who would like to pierce the veil of
secrecy.
The right to privacy is the "right to be let alone. "43 Although
the right to privacy is not enumerated in the Bill of Rights, Justice
Douglas has reasoned that the Constitution creates a penumbra of
privacy." Further, the United States Supreme Court iterated the
concept of a "right to privacy" in Griswold v. Connecticut.45 In that
case, the Court struck down a state statute that not only banned
contraceptives but also prohibited the dissemination of information
regarding them.' Such a statute, which allows a state to sit in
judgment and determine what information is useful and what should be
heard, seems to violate the very soul of the First Amendment.47
Subsequently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,' the Supreme Court
expanded the meaning of Griswold. Eisenstadt abolished any
13 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REv. 193, 195 (1890) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATIS ON THE LAW
OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACr 29 (2d ed.
1888)).
4 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas found a
constitutional right to privacy based on the penumbras of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 484-85. "[S]pecific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have.penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 480.
' See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
"Those who won our independence . . .knew that . . .it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies." Id. at 375.
4'405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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distinctions that may have existed between the right to privacy of
married individuals and that of single individuals. 49 This "right to
privacy" has since been extended to include such issues as abortion.'
In an effort to protect sealed record statutes, courts have also included
adoption under this umbrella of the "right to privacy.
51
C. Adoptive Parents
It has been suggested that an adoptee's quest for information is
a betrayal of the adoptive parents who have opened their heart and
home. 2 However, most adoptees do not desire to open sealed birth
records to find "new parents." They oftentimes simply wish to get
relevant medical, psychological, or ancestral information.53 Such
I9 "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
I Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held a woman's right
to privacy is a "fundamental right" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
153.
5' See, e.g., Application of Maple, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763-65 (Mo. 1978) (holding
that a Missouri statute denying an adoptee the right to access her birth records
did not unconstitutionally deprive her of her right to liberty or a right to privacy
but, rather, protected the privacy interests of the birth parents).
I Id. at 73. Adoptive parents have felt particularly threatened by the possibility
of changes in the present policies. They fear that a liberalization of the sealed
record laws would lead to the loss of their adopted child to the birth parents.
There is no evidence to substantiate such fears.
I See Barbara Prager & Stanley A. Rothstein, The Adoptee's Right to Know His
Natural Heritage, 19 N.Y.L. FORuM 137, 139 (1973-74).
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information cannot be provided by adoptive parents. 54
The purpose of sealed record statutes in regard to the adoptive
parents is to allow these parents to "raise [the] child without fear of
interference from the natural parents and without fear that the birth
status of an illegitimate child will be revealed or used as a means of
harming the child or themselves." 55 However, the need for this
protection is greatly diminished once the adoptee becomes an adult.
This does not minimize the concerns and fears that adoptive parents
often feel when adoptees seek out their birth parents. 56 However,
many adoptive parents understand that their child's quest for
information is a personal need.' "Most [adoptive parents] know deep
within themselves that they adopted because they wanted a chance to
parent, not because they were promised a lifetime of secrecy. "58
D. Adoptees and Their Right to Receive Information
i. Levels of Review Adopted by the Courts
Most people can relate to the experience of sitting in a doctor's
waiting room filling out the medical questionnaire. However, only
some can relate to the frustration of skipping over the section that asks
' SOROSKY, supra note 12, at 221. "It would appear that very few adoptees are
provided with enough background information to incorporate into their
developing ego and sense of identity." Id.
55 Mills, 372 A.2d at 649.
56 See, SOROsKY, supra note 12, at 221. "Some adoptive parents insisted that
they would not have adopted had they felt their children would one day leave
them to search for their 'real parents."' Id.
s7Id. at 85.
581 Id. at 221.
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"Does your family have a history of .... "5 9 This and other such
frustrations must be confronted regularly by adoptees under a closed-
record regime. As a result, adoptees contend that sealed records
discriminate against a group based on their status.' Adoptees argue
that sealed records violate their right to equal protection by denying
them access to information readily available to non-adoptees.61
However, courts have held that the right to receive information does
not include the unwilling disclosure of nonpublic records at the request
of an adoptee.62
In reviewing equal protection claims, the Supreme Court has
developed the following three levels of judicial review: strict
scrutiny,63 rational basis,' and an intermediate level of review. "Strict
scrutiny" review is applied when a classification discriminates against
51 See, e.g., Prager, supra note 53, at 139. "It is difficult even to comprehend
the necessity of the adoptee's desire to learn the identity of his biological parents.
The pleasure of associating with one's blood relatives is wholly taken for
granted, yet these simple joys are never known to an adoptive person.
Moreover, the adoptee is deprived of the very knowledge of his parentage."
I See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d at 653; ALMA Society Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d
1225, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
61 See ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233. See also BETY JEAN LIFTON, TWICE
BoRN 4 (1975). "I say. that society by sealing birth records, by cutting adoptees
off from their biological past, by keeping secrets from them, has made them into
a separate breed, unreal even to themselves." Id.
62 In the Matter of Roger B., 407 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1980); see also ALMA
Society, 601 F.2d at 1233-36; See also Mills, 372 A.2d at 653.
63 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
Id.
See West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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a suspect class! or involves a "fundamental right," and requires that
the state show that the classification furthers a compelling state
interest.6 "Rational basis" review, a less stringent test, is applied
when rights such as those connected to economic and social welfare
interests are implicated. The rational basis test asks whether a statute
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 67  The third,
"intermediate," level of scrutiny developed in response to
discrimination against members of a "quasi-suspect" class. Quasi-
suspect status is afforded to classifications based on gender,68
A suspect class includes race, lineage and alienage. For a discussion see
Prager, supra note 53, at 141-46.
6 There are two classes of rights that are considered "fundamental." The first
class includes rights guaranteed by the first ten amendments, such as the freedom
of speech and the right of interstate migration. The second class includes rights
which are not explicitly guaranteed by a constitutional amendment, but relies on
the Equal Protection Clause. Some of these rights relate to areas of sex,
marriage, child-bearing and child-rearing. For a detailed discussion on
fundamental rights see John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978).
67 See Prager, supra note 53, at 141-42. However in some cases, courts have
articulated a stricter standard in interpreting mere rationality by applying a more
rigid standard than was first articulated by the Supreme Court. "[Tihe
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all personssimilarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
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illegitimacy, 9 and alienage.7° Under the intermediate level of scrutiny,
courts apply a standard that falls somewhere between strict and rational
basis scrutiny." Which standard should be applied to the equal
protection claims -of adoptees is a much debated question.
ii. Adoptees as a Suspect or Quasi-suspect Class
Adoptees contend they are a suspect class, and that sealed
record statutes should be subject to strict scrutiny.72 Adoptees argue
that they are a "stigmatized class" because the state denies adoptees
information about their identity.73 Furthermore, they argue that sealed
record statutes do not serve a compelling state interest sufficient to
satisfy the strict scrutiny standard.74
9 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). A Louisiana statute prohibited
"unacknowledged illegitimates" from bringing a wrongful death action for their
mother's death. Although the court purported to use a mere rationality standard,
it subjected the statute to a more rigid test that approached strict scrutiny. Id. at
70-71.
70 See Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The court prohibited a statute that
denied education to illegal-alien children. The court rejected the argument that
illegal aliens should be treated as a suspect class. However, the court applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny because of the powerless nature of the children and
the importance of education. Id. at 221-30.
7 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. In Craig, a gender discrimination case,
the court articulated that "classification by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id.
72 HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 13.01(3)(a)(v)(e)(1993). See also
Mills, 372 A.2d at 653; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1233.
73 Mills, 372 A.2d at 653.
Id.; see also Burke, supra note 26, at 1214.
The constitutional right of privacy is the freedom of an
individual to make fundamental decisions regarding his
personal or family life . . . However, the right to make
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However, courts have rejected the argument that adoptees are
a suspect class. Courts have held that "suspect classes are those that
suffer from an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth"' and that, unlike race or alienage, being adopted is
not such an "immutable characteristic." Courts largely reason that
while such things as race are predetermined by ancestry, adoption is a
choice 6 This reasoning totally disregards the fact that this "choice"
is the birth parents' choice, not the adoptee's. The fact is, a person has
as much choice in being an adoptee as she has control over her race or
alienage. Nevertheless, courts are unwilling to recognize the adoptee
status as equivalent to race or alienage.'
Alternatively, adoptees contend that sealed record statutes
should be subject to strict scrutiny because these statutes violate the
Thirteenth Amendment. The argument has been made that "statutes
that require sealing of the adoption records as to adults constitute the
second of the five incidents of slavery, namely, the abolition of the
parental relation ... ,78 Since the protection of the Thirteenth
Amendment is absolute, were it applied, the interests of birth or
adoptive parents would become irrelevant.79 However, courts dismiss
fundamental decisions may have little meaning where the state
engages in the sort of indirect interference which deprives the
individual of control over information about himself.
Id. (emphasis in original).
7 In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
76 id.
I See e.g., id.
78ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1230.
79 Id. at 1236.
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this argument because they are reluctant to expand the application of
the Thirteenth Amendment in this way.
s8
Finally, courts have refused to extend the category of
fundamental rights to include an adoptee's right "to know his own
origins." 8' Because the sealed record statutes do not violate a
fundamental right, these statutes are measured against less rigid
standards of scrutinyA82
Because courts refuse to treat adoptees as a suspect class,
adoptees argue that they should at least be afforded the same level of
protection as "illegitimates," who are considered a quasi-suspect
class!' Adoptees contend that since courts refer to adoptees as
"illegitimate" children, then adoptees should receive the same
protection as "illegitimate" children.' However, courts have
responded that even if adoptees were considered a quasi-suspect class,
80 Id.
81 See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 753.
s Id. The Illinois Supreme Court applied a rational relationship standard to a
sealed record statute. The court held that the statute was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest -- preserving the integrity of the adoption process. Id.
at 756. See also ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1231-33.
83 Levy, 391 U.S. at 70-71. "Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights
merely because of his birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the
responsibilities of a citizen, including payment of taxes and conscription under
Selective Service Act. How under our constitutional regime can he be denied
correlative rights which other citizens enjoy?" Id.
84 In San Antonio Independent School Dist., Justice Marshall recognized the need
to give greater constitutional protection to "illegitimate" children. San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Justice Marshall
dissenting). Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something which the
individual cannot control, and should generally be irrelevant in legislative
considerations. Yet illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society.
Hence, dfiscrimination on the basis of birth-particularly when it affects innocent
children-warrants special judicial consideration. Id.
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sealed record statutes would survive the intermediate level of
scrutiny.1 The courts have based this response on their reasoning that
access to sealed records is denied equally to adoptees and non-adoptees
alike.86 However, the courts' reasoning is flawed. The courts have
justified the laws by saying they are nondiscriminatory because they
appear to treat all people equally. In application, however, the laws
are arbitrary and capriciousY A law which denies adoptees access to
birth records does not treat adoptees and non-adoptees equally. Only
adoptees are deprived of their ancestry. Non-adoptees are unaffected
by the law.
As a result of the courts' decisions, a line has been drawn
excluding adoptees from protection that is afforded to other classes.
The adoptee is denied rights "merely because of his birth. "88 The right
of the adoptee is sacrificed for the integrity of the adoption process, a
process which is ironically purported to serve the adoptee.
iii. The Adoptee's First Amendment Right to Receive
Information
Adoptees contend that denying information about their birth
violates their First Amendment right. The First Amendment not only
protects the freedom of speech, but also the freedom to receive
information.89 The First Amendment prohibits the state from deciding
85 See ALMA Society, 601 F.2d at 1234.
861 In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d at 756.
7 See e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Supreme Court held
that a statute which is neutral on its face, but is applied in a discriminatory
fashion is unconstitutional. Id. at 373-74.
"Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
89 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). The
Supreme Court struck down a state statute that required an addressee of foreign
communist propaganda to make a formal written request for his mail to the U.S.
post office. The Court held that the state interfered with the addressee's First
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that ignorance is preferable to the free flow of truthful information. 90
However, courts have refused to include the adoptee's right to receive
information within the realm of the First Amendment.9' Courts
consistently have held that sealed record statutes serve the valid state
interest of protecting the adoption process.92
IV. THE PROCESS OF OPENING SEALED RECORDS
The struggle between the birth parents' right to privacy and
the adoptee's right to information has plagued the courts for as long as
adoption statutes have existed. 93 Despite the numerous attacks on the
Amendment right to receive information and ideas. See also Red Lions
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The FCC denied the
public's right to receive information by denying a radio frequency to a
broadcaster who expressed controversial views.
9 See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 763-65 (1976).
91 See, e.g., Application of Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 762.
[Tihe states' protection of the adoption process by control of
its judicial .records does not rise to the level of an
unconstitutional infringement of [adoptee's] First Amendment
right to receive information but rather is the exercise of a valid
state interest, balancing conflicting rights of privacy and
protecting the integrity of the adoption process which could
suffer if the confidentiality of the records were diminished.
Id.
2 See, e.g., id.; see also In the Matter of Roger B., 407 N.E.2d 884, 886
(1980). "While the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas, the First Amendment does not guarantee a constitutional right of special
access of information not available to the public generally. The right to receive
information presupposes a willing speaker." Id. (citations omitted).
9 See, e.g., Mills, 372 A.2d 646; ALMA Society, 601 F.2d 1225.
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constitutionality of adoption statutes,94 courts have held that sealing
records is "in the best interest of the child."95 If the "child" wishes to
access these records, the "child" must show "good cause." 96 So when
does the adoptee stop being a child? How long must the adoptee carry
the burden of a contract he or she never signed?
A. The Adoptee's Burden of Showing Good Cause
State statutes,97 which require adoption records to be sealed,




Adoption statutes articulate the burden of proof the adoptee must
meet.99 However no adoption statute defines the term "good cause."
It is solely a matter of judicial discretion whether the adoptee has met
this burden.100
The case law shows that, in determining whether the burden of
94 See, e.g., Jason Kuhs, The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy: Breaking
Down the Walls of Secrecy, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 259 (1994);
Riccardello, supra note 21; Nancy Sparks, Adoption: Sealed Adoption Record
Laws-Constitutional Violation or a Need for Judicial Reform?, 35 OKLA. L. REV.
575 (1982).
91 See infra text accompanying notes 107-112.
96 See infra text accompanying notes 113-114.
1 The standard of "good cause" enumerated in statutes differs from state to state.
Some states have a more rigid standard, while other states are more lenient. For
a detailed discussion of the varying standards of "good cause" among the states.
See Melissa Arndt, Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption Controversy, 6 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 103 (1986).
98 See HOLLiNGER, Et Al., supra note 1, at § 13.01(3)(1).
99 Id.
1oo See Betty Jean Lifton, New York Forum About People Adopted Kids: Not Bad
Pennies, NEWSDAY, May 1, 1990, at 54.
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showing "good cause" has been met, courts attempt to balance the
competing interests of the adoptee, the adoptive parents, and the birth
parents. These competing interests include the following:
(1) the nature of the circumstances dictating the
need of the identity of the birth parents; (2) the
circumstances and desires of the adoptive parents;
and (3) "the circumstances of the birth parents and
their desire or at least the desire of the birth
mother not to be identified;" and (4) the interests
of the state in maintaining a viable system of
adoption by the assurance of confidentiality.1"'
However, this "competing interests" approach fails to establish
what circumstances are sufficient to tilt the scale in favor of one party
over another. Courts have been inconsistent in defining what
constitutes "necessary circumstances" to warrant opening sealed
records." One court held that an adoptee's need for genetic
information in treating a heart condition was insufficient to establish
'
0 Application of George, 625 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting
the trial court judge); see also HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at
§13.01(3)(ii).
102 See In re Assolone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1386 (R.I. 1986) (holding that an
adoptee's curiosity and desire to know her natural identity was not sufficient to
outweigh the competing interest); Matter of Linda F.M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642
(1978) (determining that psychological difficulties, including the fear of entering
into an incestuous relationship, is insufficient to show "good cause"); Matter of
Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that psychological
reasons may be sufficient to show "good cause"); Bradey v. Children's Bureau
of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C. 1981) (holding that an adoptee
who is insecure but does not require medical attention has not shown "good
cause"); In the Matter of Robert Wilson, 153 A.D.2d 748, 749 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (psychological trauma is sufficient to establish "good cause" if the trauma
is directly connected to "the lack of knowledge of ancestry").
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"good cause." 103 In that case, notice to the birth parents and a hearing
for the "interested parties" was required before "good cause" could be
established. 104  On the other hand, another court has held that
psychological reasons may be sufficient to establish "good cause"."°5
B. When Does the Adopted Child Stop Being a Child?
Adoption statutes are purported to be "in the best interest of
the child."'1°6 However, state statutes tend to differ in their use of the
term "best interest."'" Courts reason that sealed records are "in the
best interest of the child" because they (1) protect adoptees from their
"illegitimate" past;'0 8 (2) protect adoptees from intrusions by birth
parents; ° and (3) protect the adoption process whose primary purpose
is to serve the needs of adoptees by placing them in stable homes."'
103 Golan v. Louise Wise Services, 507 N.E.2d 275, 276, 279 (N.Y. 1987).
114 Id. at 278.
101 Matter of Dixon, 323 N.W.2d at 552.
106 For a detailed discussion of "the best interest of the child" standard see
GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 3.
107 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 45a-726a (West 1994) (allowing decision
makers to consider the sexual orientation of the adoptive parents); N.J. STAT
ANN. § 30:4c-26.7 (West 1994) (giving foster parents who have cared for the
child for two years preference in adopting the child); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-102
(Michie 1995) (giving preference to adoptive parents with the same racial or
ethnic heritage as the adoptee).
"03 See, e.g., People v. Doe, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 309. "Adoption assures... that
the interests of the child will be protected in that no one will ever know by means
of the adoption proceeding that the child is illegitimate." Id.
109 ANONYMOUS, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 781; see also Mills, 372 A.2d at 649.
"I Application of Sage, 586 P.2d at 1204.
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The problem is that state statutes and courts refer to adoptees
as "adopted children" long after these "children" have reached the age
of majority.111 By referring to adoptees as "children," the state and the
courts can justify their paternal actions. They can hide behind the
claim that the adoption statutes are written and enforced as they are in
an attempt to protect the best interest of the child.112  But this
"protection" extends well beyond its need. The courts fail to address
the fact that the state's role as parens patriae ends when the adoptee
reaches majority."' When does the child grow up?"' When is the
child treated with the same deference as the other parties to the
adoption "triangle"?
V. THE 1994 UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
"1 See, e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d at 763. "The primary concern of the
state must be to protect and foster an effective scheme for adoption, thus serving
the best interest of the child." Id. The Uniform Adoption Act defines "child" as
"a minor or adult son or daughter . .. . " Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 4,
at § 1-101(4) (emphasis added).
112 Matter of Dixon, 323 N.W.2d at 553.
113 See, e.g., Application of Sage, 586 P.2d 1201. "[W]e must keep in mind that
the adopted child eventually becomes an adult, and one may question whether
continued confidentiality remains in the adoptee's best interest once he reaches
majority." Id. at 1203. Despite the court's apparent insight into the adoption
dilemma, the court denied the plaintiff, an adult adoptee, access to his birth
records. The court held that the plaintiff's interests did not outweigh the
countervailing interests of the birth parents, adoptive parents and the state. Id.
at 1206-07.
14 See, e.g., Lifton, supra note 100, at 54. "What makes Joe special is that he
is a 50-year-old 'adopted child.'" Id. (commenting on the incongruity of the
adoption process).
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Laws approved the Uniform Adoption Act in August 1994.115 The
Uniform Adoption Act is meant to serve as a model for states in
constructing their adoption statutes." 6 The purpose of the Uniform
Adoption Act is to encourage consistency in adoption laws among the
states." 7 However, the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act, along with its
predecessors," 8 has failed to unify state adoption laws." 9 States are
not bound to follow the Uniform Adoption Act, and to date no state
has adopted it."
The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act has also received criticism
from numerous adoption and child welfare organizations. Opponents
of the Act contend that it "fails to address the rights of birth parents
and the needs of adoptive children; it leans heavily toward the rights
of adoptive parents.121 For example, the Act allows a birth mother
only eight days after the child is born to revoke consent of the
adoption.1
The current Act is also criticized for not mandating open
records." It has been commented that "the provision [requiring
115 See Mark Hansen, Fears of the Heart, ABA., Nov. 1994, at 58-59.
116 Id.
117 Adoption Laws, NAT'L. L. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at A24 [hereinafter Adoption
Laws].
"I The Uniform Adoption Act was first enacted in 1951. The last revision of the
Act was in 1971. See HOLLiNGER, ET. AL., supra note 1, at § 1.01[1].
119 See Hansen, supra note 115, at 59.
120 Adoption Laws, supra note 117, at A24.
121 Nancy Newman, Bid to Reform Adoption Laws Isn't Progress, NAT'L. L. J.,
Feb. 12, 1996, at A21.
122 Uniform Adoption Act, supra note 4, at § 2-404(a).
123 See Hansen, supra note 115, at 61.
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confidentiality] is a throwback to the 1950s, when adoptions were
closed because of the stigma of illegitimacy."' The Act does require
birth parents to furnish the adoptive parents with information regarding
their medical and psychological history,' and social history such as
religion and tribal affiliations, education, and criminal convictions.126
However, these provisions have been criticized as merely being "for
the convenience of people who want to adopt healthy newborns." '1 7
For example, although the medical and psychological history will be
of some benefit to the adoptee, the Act does not provide for the
transmission of information to adoptive parents regarding medical
changes or discoveries that occur after the child is adopted. Thus, the
medical and psychological information may be incomplete and
misleading.
Considering the strong opposition to the current Uniform
Adoption Act,' 28 and the failure of its predecessors to unify state
adoption laws, it is unlikely that the 1994 Act will be successful in
uniting the current adoption laws. Thus, the current standards, such
as "good cause" and "in the best interest of the child," will continue to
produce inconsistent rulings among the states.
124 Id. at 61 (quoting Ann Sullivan, director of the adoption program for the
Child Welfare League).
125 Unif. Adoption Act supra note 4, at § 2-106.
126 Id.
127 See Hansen, supra note 115, at 60.
12 The 1994 Uniform Adoption Act has been criticized by the Child Welfare
League, the National Association of Social Workers and the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges. See Thorn Weidlich, States Take Up 'Speedy'
Uniform Adoption Law, NAT'L. L. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at All.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE SEALED RECORD STATUTES
There have been movements in the state legislatures to open
sealed adoption records. Currently, New York,'29 New Jersey,su and
Pennsylvania313 have bills before their state legislatures that would
require the release of information currently in sealed records.
However, the bills are meeting strong opposition by traditionalists,
who believe that the adoption process will be thrust into turmoil if
sealed record requirements are abandoned."3 Consequently, the battle
of releasing sealed records rages on.
A. Current Approaches
There are several current approaches to circumventing the
harshness of permanantly sealed records. These include mutual
'
29 See A.B. 2160, 218th Gen Assem., 1st Sess., 1995 N.Y. The assembly bill
proposes that an adoptee may request identifiable information about her birth
parents. However, before the information can be released, first the adoptee must
give proof that the adoptive parents are deceased or get the consent of surviving
adoptive parents and second, the birth parent must authorize the disclosure of the
information. Id.
130 Currently there are.two separate bills before the New Jersey Legislature. The
assembly bill would allow an adoptee, at the age of majority, to obtain an
original birth certificate. However, birth parents are given twelve months from
the effective date of the bill to request that their names not be disclosed on the
birth certificates. See A.B. 742, 207th Leg., 1st Sess., 1996 N.J. In addition to
the assembly bill, a separate senate bill proposes to allow for the exchange of
non-identifiable information and medical history. See S. 567, 207th Leg., 1st
Sess., 1996 N.J.
13' A senate bill proposes to allow an adoptee to obtain her original birth
certificate. The bill would also establish a statewide registry which will retain
adoption documents and release the documents to adoptees, adoptive parents and
birth parents. See S. 877, 179th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 1995 Pa.
13 See supra text accompanying note 22.
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consent registries and the activities of private volunteer organizations.
Mutual consent registries are state-created registries where birth
parents and adoptees, who have reached the age of majority, can
register.' If a match is made, identifling information is released to
both parties.
Along with state registries, numerous private organizations
have developed in response to the controversy over sealed record
statutes."34 Volunteer organizations are staffed by adoptees, birth
parents, and adoptive parents. The private organizations operate
similarly to the state-created mutual consent registries. Both the
adoptee and the birth parent must register with such an organization
and, if a match is made, the parties are then contacted.
Both the mutual consent registries and private organizations
are effective means of circumventing the sealed record statutes,
provided that neither party is reluctant to register or is deceased, and
that both parties join the same registry or organization.135 Otherwise,
the registries fail in their purpose. In situations where the registries
133 The New Jersey Assembly bill proposes a "voluntary information exchange
mechanism to permit adopted adults and members of their birth families to record
and share their current names, addresses and medical, cultural and social
history." See A.B. 742, 207th Leg., 1st Sess., 1996 N.J. For an in depth
discussion on mutual consent registries see Kuhn, supra note 940, at 280-83.
134 Some of the private organizations include Adoptee Liberty Movement of
America (ALMA), American Adoption Congress (AAC) and Concerned Birth
Parents (CUB). For a complete list of private organizations see SOROSKY, supra
note 12.
135 Given the growing number of private adoption "search" organizations that
have developed in recent years, it is not unlikely for parties who actively search
to register at different organizations. Because many of the organizations charge
fees, a searching party may not be able financially to join them all.
Consequently, parties who actively search for each other, but join different
registries may never connect.
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fail, adoptees are left dealing with the court system. For many
adoptees, this is not much of an option.'36
B. Independent Adoptions
In a traditional agency adoption, the birth parents relinquish
their parental rights to an agency and the agency, in turm, places the
child with adoptive parents. However, there is a growing trend toward
independent adoptions.' 3 In an independent adoption, the birth parents
select the adoptive parents with the help of an attorney, doctor, or
other professional.' The birth parents and adoptive parents spend
time together, and usually the adoptive parents pay the birth mother's
maternity expenses and legal fees.139
Unlike an agency adoption, the adoptive parents in an
independent situation have the opportunity to get to know the birth
parents and ask any necessary background and medical information.
However, when the adoption is finalized, the original birth record is
sealed just as in an agency adoption.' ° Thus, the adoptee will
ultimately only know what the adoptive parents thought to ask about.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 97-114.
137 See Paula K. Bebensee, In the Best Interest of Children and Adoptive Parents:
The Need for Disclosure, 78 IOWA L. REv. 397, 401 (1993).
"I See id. at 402; see also Pamela K. Strom Amlung, Conflicts of Interest in
Independent Adoptions: Pitfalls for Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 169, 169
(1990).
139 See HOLLINGER, ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.05(3)(b).
140 See supra text accompanying note 13.
1996-1997
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
C. Open Adoptions
Open adoptions are much like independent adoptions. The
major difference is that, in an open adoption, the birth parents and
adoptive parents agree to maintain an ongoing relationship, even after
the birth parents relinquish their parental rights. 141 The degree of
contact between the birth parents and the adoptee is decided by the
parties involved, and can range from regular visits to sporadic letters
or telephone calls.'
42
Advocates contend that open adoptions benefit all members of
the adoption "triangle." The birth parents keep some ties to the
adoptee, thus "alleviat[ing] the fears the birth mother has about the
adoptive placement ... .14 The adoptive parents' fear that the birth
parents will return is eliminated, because the birth parents are a part of
the adoptive parents' and adoptee's lives.' 44 Finally, adoptees who
know who their birth parents are are able to get answers to medical
and other questions by something as simple as making a phone call, as
opposed to having to stage an emotional and often fruitless search. 45
Opponents contend that open adoptions may force "unwanted
abortions" for birth parents who desire confidentiality.' 46 Opponents
also argue that because of the birth parents' emotional state, they may
not be "the best judge of what kind of people would make good
141 See SOROSKY, supra note 12, at 207; Carol Amadio and Stuart Deutsch, Open
Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to "Stay in Touch" with Blood Relatives,
22 J. FAM. L. 59, 60-61 (1983-84).
14 See ADAMEC, supra note 1, at 210.
143 Id. at 212.
4 Id.
145 Id.
'4 Id. at 213.
VOL. XV
Balancing the Adoption Triangle
parents."147  In addition, birth parents may not "psychologically
relinquish" their feeling of entitlement toward the adoptee.14 This, in
turn, may hinder the adoptive parents' ability to bond with the
adoptee.
149
In any event, it is unlikely that open adoptions will ever replace
traditional agency adoptions. Independent and open adoptions
currently comprise only ten percent of the adoptions that take place in
the United States. 5 °
D. A Different Approach - Unlocking Sealed Records
Adoption records should be released to any adoptee who has
reached the age of majority. Current legislative proposals would allow
an adoptee, upon reaching the age of majority, to access birth records
upon demand only if the birth parent does not object. The current
proposals allow the birth parent to prevent the release of identifying
information by contacting the court or agency15 1 Although the current
proposals do not address the issue, it is presumed that if the birth
parent objects to the release of the information, the adoptee must go
through the court system and battle the arbitrary "good cause"
standard.
A better, truly balanced approach would not allow birth parents
to unilaterally decide whether or not information should be released.
Instead, if the birth parents have requested that records remain sealed,
they should be required to share the burden currently carried only by





, ' See supra notes 129-131.
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"good cause" why the records should remain sealed. However, for
this approach to work, legislatures must establish a uniform standard
for "good cause" for both the adoptee and the birth parent. If the birth
parent establishes "good cause" why records should remain sealed, the
court may compromise between the interests of the birth parent and the
adoptee. A compromise could include releasing all birth records while
deleting any identifying information, or requiring the birth parents to
supply the adoptee with an updated, in-depth medical history.
This approach allows the court to truly balance the interests of
the parties involved while still protecting the current integrity of the
adoption process. An adoptee who reaches the age of majority, is old
enough to make the decision to request that her records be released,
and is no longer in need of the state's parens patriae protection. In
addition, the birth parents are afforded an opportunity to reflect on the
adoptee's decision. If anonymity is still desired, the birth parents can
present their reasons to the court. On the other hand, birth parents
who have not been able "to close the door" are given an opportunity
to reunite with the adoptee. Further, adoptive parents are ensured that
birth parents will not interfere in their relationship with the adoptee.
By the time the adoptee has reached majority, and decides to seek
desired information, the adoptive parent-adoptee relationship is well
forged. In summary, with all of the parties' interests addressed, the
state's concern for the integrity of the adoption process is preserved.
VII. CONCLUSION
Legislatures contend that sealing birth records balances the
rights of the adoption "triangle." They claim that it balances the birth
parents' right to privacy with the adoptive parents' right to raise the
adopted child without fear of the birth parents' returning. Both
legislatures and courts contend that sealed record statutes protect the
adoptee's rights by ensuring an adoptee is placed in a more stable
home and that the adoptee's "illegitimate" past remains undisclosed.
However, many adoptees contend that the need to know their origins
is not properly considered. The balancing approach places the birth
parents' and adoptive parents' right to privacy above the adoptee's
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right to receive information. By failing to include the adoptee's right
to receive information, the adoption "triangle" is incomplete.
Attempts to unify state adoption laws through the Uniform
Adoption Act have not been successful. In addition, the courts have
not been able to establish one standard for "good cause" or "in the best
interest of the child." Because of these inconsistencies, the adoption
process cannot function adequately and must be re-examined. In re-
examining sealed records statutes, legislatures must consider that these
statutes were enacted in an era when unplanned pregnancies and single
parenthood were taboo. It is time to pierce the veil of secrecy.

